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“Ultimately, it may take a climate-related natural disaster to spur Russia toward
sustainability.”
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V
ladimir Putin’s Russia is deeply dependent
on its fossil energy resources. This depen-
dence is more profound than the dysfunc-
tional dynamic that political economists have
traditionally believed is the result of the intertwin-
ing of natural resources and political power. In
Russia, fossil energy and state power are entangled
to such an extent that the spheres of culture and
identity are also caught in the web.
Fossil energy is central to Russia’s economy. Oil,
gas, and coal account for more than half the central
government’s budget revenue. The oil and gas
industries make up a fifth of gross domestic product.
Yet Russia has all the material resources needed
to become an ecological great power—a green
giant. It has the level of technological development
required to foster an energy transition toward
renewable resources and a low-carbon economy.
The country’s vast forests offer great potential for
bioenergy production, and its immense territory
would allow it to develop a range of other forms
of renewable energy.
Despite all this potential, the political elite’s
deep attachment to the rents and power it derives
from hydrocarbons leaves it strongly opposed to
calls for an energy transition. Russia is lagging far
behind other world powers—notably China, the
European Union, and the United States—in the
deployment of renewable energy.
Industries devoted to resource extraction have
been at the core of the Russian economy throughout
its history—from furs, coal, and ore to oil and gas.
The resulting practices resembled those found in
other colonial contexts around the world: Siberian
expanses were seen as exploitable resource-rich
territories, and indigenous cultures were subju-
gated to serve the needs of the imperial center. Dur-
ing the Soviet era, industrialization relied on the
heavy use of natural resources; industrial produc-
tion targets were prioritized over social welfare and
environmental protection.
Russia’s deposits of oil, gas, coal, and uranium
are not evenly distributed across its Eurasian ter-
ritory—they are found mainly in the periphery.
Developing these resources thus has required
major infrastructural investments. Yet the more
Russia has invested in energy infrastructure (gas
and oil pipelines, ports, and so forth), the more its
strategic choices have narrowed. Revenues from
hydrocarbons help maintain the existing networks
of political power, and long-term investments in
fossil-fuel infrastructures generate institutional
inertia, making a transition to a carbon-free energy
system less feasible.
Nonetheless, the government in recent years has
promoted clean energy, at least in its official pro-
nouncements. Its national strategies have stressed
the priority of increasing energy efficiency through-
out the economy, from households to the public
sector and industry, and have urged the deploy-
ment of renewables as a substitute for oil and coal
in the domestic energy mix. Of course, using less oil
and gas domestically would allow more of it to be
sold on international markets at higher premiums.
These strategies may well indicate the direction
in which the government would like to see its
energy policies eventually shift. The intent also
may be to reassure the rest of the world about its
goals. But the projections appear overly optimistic.
Russia’s 2009 Energy Strategy states that the share
of renewables in the national energy mix should
cover 14 percent of total demand by 2030. More
than a decade later, though, so-called new renew-
ables (solar, wind, geothermal, and small-scale
hydropower) account for just 1 percent of the
nation’s energy supply.
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FOSSIL POWER
Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in
2012, after a four-year interim as prime minister,
began a new expansion of the political system’s
autocratic elements. This has been evident in both
domestic and foreign policy. The Kremlin’s
emphasis is now on geopolitical sovereignty. Its
tone on climate change leans toward denial, while
it works to strengthen the link between fossil
energy and Russian identity.
Russia’s status as a hydrocarbon superpower
gives it the ability to influence the political choices
of other countries with its energy exports. Yet
Russian elites and the public are ambivalent about
the idea that hydrocarbons serve as the fundamen-
tal basis of Russia’s status or national identity. The
elites are aware of the economic problems related to
hydrocarbon dependence: exporting raw materials
while importing goods puts Russia in the company
of developing nations. Although a majority of Rus-
sians consider their country an energy superpower,
many live in poverty and resent the wealth enjoyed
by the elites.
Meanwhile, global energy
markets have changed greatly
during the past decade due
to the growing importance
of unconventional hydrocar-
bons (shale oil and gas) and
renewable sources. This has
undermined Russia’s export
prospects, forcing it to engage in more aggressive
competition—as was demonstrated by Moscow’s
maneuvers during the spring of 2020. When the
coronavirus pandemic led to a collapse in energy
demand worldwide, Russia initially refused to
strike a deal with OPEC and the Saudis to reduce
its oil production volumes. Once the price col-
lapsed, Russia finally went along, but the produc-
tion cuts were too limited and came too late to
calm the markets. Prices partially recovered only
after global consumption of oil began to rise again.
Before the pandemic, Moscow saw little reason
to defer to ambitious international climate objec-
tives, such as the pledged emission cuts under the
2015 Paris Climate Agreement, and those set by
the European Union’s Green Deal policy (aiming
to achieve a carbon-neutral economy by 2050)
announced in December 2019. The Kremlin
downplayed environmental responsibility while
promoting a national identity based on hydrocar-
bons. A nation that sees its identity as intertwined
with fossil energy is unlikely to take a progressive
role in global climate politics. And Moscow has
further distanced itself from Western-backed
agendas during its intensified confrontation with
the West in the past few years, particularly since
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and military
intervention in Ukraine resulted in the imposition
of US–European sanctions.
The Kremlin’s notions of Russia’s destiny as an
energy superpower have been actively promoted
by the hydrocarbon industry. The giant state-
owned gas company Gazprom has run advertising
campaigns to portray the industry as a guarantor
of a uniquely Russian mix of neoconservative and
traditional, patriarchal values, while casting Rus-
sian citizens and communities in submissive roles.
These discourses, part of the regime’s efforts to
construct a hydrocarbon culture, are rooted in
a nationalistic modernization ethos that has car-
ried over from the Soviet era.
The governmental mentality visible in Gazprom’s
advertisements pursues various conservative objec-
tives, but by far the most important is entrenching
Putin’s regime and its economic policy relying on the
extraction of fossil energy.
Hydrocarbon culture serves
as a tool to prevent popular
criticism of an economy that
resembles those of developing
states in its dependence on ex-
porting raw materials. This
energy culture opposes the
modernization of Russia’s economic and industrial
policies. It also advocates authoritarian rule and the
regime’s great power ambitions.
Russia’s energy culture distorts environmental
policy as well. State-controlled national media
propagate a climate-denial narrative, while state-
owned energy firms block the development of
more sustainable policies at the regional level.
SKEWED VISION
The severe effects of climate change should not
come as a surprise to anyone, given the scientific
evidence built up over the past few decades. But the
Kremlin leadership tends to view climate change as
beneficial, since other countries will suffer more
than Russia. The narrative in the Russian media is
that bad things may happen because of climate
change, but Russia will not be affected. This story
has been told to Russians since at least the 1990s.
The prevalent idea of Russia as a fortress
surrounded by enemies skews security and risk
perceptions. This parochial view of the world is
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Russian elites perceive global
climate governance as
a zero-sum game.
unable to see climate change as a common prob-
lem facing all of humanity. Instead, Russian elites
perceive global climate governance as a zero-sum
game.
According to this worldview, the solution is not
taking responsibility by reducing hydrocarbon
production and consumption, but using thought
control to instill climate denial at home while free-
riding internationally, leaving other countries that
are suffering more from global warming to assume
the burdens of mitigation. Yet when those imple-
menting mitigation measures, such as the EU, hap-
pen to be the main customers for Russia’s energy
exports, the fossil-based regime may perceive mit-
igation as a security threat.
Climate change will have global consequences
for human security. It may cause conflicts and ref-
ugee crises in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa due
to resource shortages. Yet such scenarios are
almost completely absent from Russia’s climate
discussion. In the Russian media, refugee flows
from the Middle East and Africa to Europe are
depicted as a failure of the EU, and Moscow has
tried to exploit the situation opportunistically. Yet
the potential for climate change–induced Central
Asian refugee flows to Russia is not considered.
In Russia, the warming climate will impose eco-
nomic costs by thawing the permafrost that covers
approximately 60 percent of the country’s terri-
tory. Industrial, transportation, and housing infra-
structure is vulnerable to permafrost thaw.
Structures in these areas will be at risk of collapse
in a warmer climate, as their foundations become
unstable on the soft ground left behind by melting
ice. The huge Norilsk diesel spill in June 2020
demonstrated these risks. At least 17,000 tons of
diesel oil spilled into a lake and rivers flowing into
the Arctic Ocean when the foundations of fuel
storage tanks at a power plant collapsed after a heat
wave that likely accelerated permafrost melting.
The majority of Russia’s untapped hydrocarbon
deposits are in the permafrost areas. Environmen-
tal change will darken the economic outlook for
future projects to extract these deposits, which
may eventually need to be written off as stranded
assets. Russian energy companies have taken little
action to hedge against this risk, even as some of
their Western counterparts are announcing plans
to begin a transition into renewables.
The Putin regime’s nationalist-conservative shift
makes it hard to imagine that Russia could take any
meaningful role in the battle against climate
change, especially given its failure to evaluate the
associated transnational risks. But climate change is
a security threat for all nations. Ultimately, it may
take a climate-related natural disaster to spur
Russia toward sustainability. For now, the nation
remains a laggard, unable to profit economically or
politically from the transition to a new carbon-
neutral world energy order.
The logic of a hydrocarbon culture is at odds with
Russia’s ambitions to rise to a higher level of tech-
nological progress. Developing more innovative
industries, a prerequisite for transitioning toward
a sustainable economy built on renewable energies,
would necessitate abandoning that culture’s prac-
tices and mentalities. Instead, the Kremlin is turning
to both military and nonmilitary forms of aggres-
sion—a wide repertoire of tactics known as “hybrid
warfare”—to compensate for the technological lead
of Western countries and China.
Since 2015, Russia’s National Security Strategy
has stated that both direct and indirect means
must be used in the global struggle for power to
achieve a “strategic deterrent.” Thus a rapid global
transition to new energy technologies may be
viewed by Moscow as a security threat that must
be confronted with hybrid warfare. Russian back-
ing and financing for far-right parties in the EU is
one example of this kind of action: right-wing
populists try not only to weaken the EU, but also
to dismantle its joint climate policy and prevent it
from speaking with a common voice on energy
and foreign policy. But building a more sustain-
able Russia, able to reap the benefits of the global
energy transition, is not part of the Kremlin’s
strategy.
CHANGE FROM WITHIN
Under Putin, Moscow has continued the
centuries-old practices of an empire that is violent
toward its own people and the outside world, yet
unable to harness Russia’s bountiful resources and
their potential to be part of a climate solution for
the planet. Turning Russia into an internally
strong and internationally respected player would
require rethinking the objectives and rules of the
game in both domestic and cross-border contexts.
How can Russians foster change from within, and
how can Russia’s international partners encourage
such a transformation?
Debunking hydrocarbon propaganda would be
a first step. This might involve revealing the ratio-
nale as well as the actors behind specific promo-
tional campaigns glorifying the hydrocarbon
culture. Publishing such exposés will be difficult
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in an increasingly closed media environment, but
they are necessary to show the Russian people why
clinging to oil and gas will be perilous for them.
Opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s widely viewed
videos exposing high-level corruption could pro-
vide a model for how civil society might play a role
in such a campaign.
The next step would be to develop an argument
laying out Russia’s potential to become an ecolog-
ical great power. The nation could achieve sustain-
ability by unleashing its potential in renewable
energy, as well as in carbon storage. It could do
so by protecting its forests, bogs, and permafrost.
This would be a path to great power status
achieved not through coercion, but through soft
power. Russia would be respected for the ecolog-
ical services it provided for the global community
and the renewable energies that would fuel its own
sustainable economy.
Since Russia exports most of its energy com-
modities, ending its addiction to windfall rents
from oil and gas will require international coop-
eration on decarbonization. The global energy
industry must face concerted
pressure to account for the
environmental costs of pro-
duction. It should adopt mea-
sures such as carbon pricing,
corporate responsibility certi-
ficates, and strict monitoring
of environmental impacts.
Only this kind of global framework can curb
national subsidies for fossil fuel production,
allowing renewable energy to compete on a fair
basis.
As Russia’s biggest export market, the EU pos-
sesses substantial leverage that it has failed to use
in its relations with Moscow. It must speak with
a common voice to exert the full potential of its
buying power. Brussels should enforce strict envi-
ronmental and social responsibility norms for all
imported energy sources.
Here, the EU’s Green Deal and its newly estab-
lished Energy Union can play a central role. The
Green Deal aims to decarbonize the commodity
chains of imported natural resources entering the
EU zone; the Energy Union is an effort to establish
a unified voice in energy policy, especially vis-à-vis
the EU’s main trade partners. A coordinated energy
policy on the EU level could effectively counter
Russia’s divide-and-rule strategy of using attrac-
tively priced bilateral energy deals to discourage
moves toward a united European position.
Putin’s entourage seeks to portray such efforts to
promote clean energy as part of an anti-Russian
conspiracy. Yet debunking the hydrocarbon cul-
ture does not mean hindering investment in Russia.
Instead, it would clear the way for investment to be
diverted to businesses that play a role in the shift to
a low-carbon society. Such an approach would
encourage Russia to take its place at the forefront
of the energy transition rather than continue to
play a spoiler role, unable to define its own fate.
Domestically, the ruling bargain based on oil and
gas must be replaced by regionalized social contracts
that are derived from local socioeconomic strengths.
This would reap the full potential of natural and
human resources in each locality and region, instead
of leaving them to rely on Moscow for patronage.
Hydrocarbon culture is the antithesis of regionally
sustainable economies; it discourages innovation
based on local resources. Instead, it pacifies both
citizens and regional leaders by promising welfare
and sustainability, though it is not able to deliver
either. The current protests against domineering
rule from Moscow in the far eastern province of
Khabarovsk can be viewed as
evidence of the failure of this
hydrocarbon-based social
contract.
HOW TO BE A GREEN
GIANT
The geopolitical implica-
tions of a global transition to renewable energy are
certain to pose risks for a monolithically ruled
hydrocarbon culture like Russia’s. Yet they repre-
sent a great opportunity for reshaping the coun-
try’s society, politics, and economy on a more
resilient and sustainable basis. The inevitable
global energy transition has already started, but
due to the Putin regime’s refusal to recognize this
reality, Russia is lagging far behind other powers
in the competition to capitalize on the shift.
Moscow’s resistance is not only self-defeating; it
is also a threat to global peace and security. As
long as Russia is unable to transform its economy,
rewrite its social contract, and abandon the old
model of hydrocarbon dominance, it will remain
an unpredictable and dangerous player in a world
that is gradually disengaging from fossil energy.
Although the prospect of hydrocarbons losing
their profitability may appear distant, now is the
time to prepare. Disasters such as the coronavirus
pandemic could accelerate the transition away
from oil and gas. Once a country falls behind in
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The regime opposes the
modernization of Russia’s
economic and industrial policies.
the race to deploy renewables on a large scale, it
is very hard to catch up. Even if renewables are
not a strategic factor in the near future, the ability
to continue to do business as usual is eroding for
fossil-dependent countries such as Russia.
If Russia reverses course and chooses to become
an ecological great power in both words and
deeds, shaping a new kind of culture and a new
energy strategy that utilizes all the assets that its
geography has to offer, the nation will flourish
economically and its society will become more
resilient. Its potentially enormous renewable
energy resources could also offer solutions for
a more sustainable world.
Russia could be the key to building a Eurasian
electricity supergrid that would provide both tran-
sit and storage infrastructure across the region.
Such a transnational project would allow Russia
to sustainably harvest all of its potential—in agri-
culture, high-tech manufacturing, and education.
The colossal structure and centralizing influence
of the hydrocarbon culture would no longer block
the nation’s development.
Russia’s relations with both Europe and China
would be able to develop in more symmetric ways.
A renewables-based electricity supergrid for
Eurasia—stretching from Lisbon to Shanghai—
would position Russia and its regions as indispens-
able actors in the production, transit, and storage
of clean energy. Trade relations emerging from
this network would confer economic, social, and
environmental benefits. They would also address
common threats, reducing unhealthy dependen-
cies while enabling urgently needed action on cli-
mate change.
Fossil energy, political power, and climate
denial are intertwined in Russia to such an extent
that building support for an ambitious policy of
reducing emissions and transitioning from a fossil-
based energy system to a carbon-neutral one will
be extremely difficult, even in the event that rela-
tively more progressive leadership comes to
power. But Russia has much more to gain than
to lose from coming to terms with reality and seiz-
ing its opportunity to become a leader in the global
shift to renewable energy. &
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